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[Elias and/or Adorno] 
A personal reflection and perspective from a musicologist
1.
Norbert Elias was the first scholar to receive the Theodor W. Adorno-preis in 1977. Adorno was, in Elias 
words, a humane Marxist. His reliance on Marx, writes Elias, brought with it disadvantages since it bound Ador-
no «to a system of thought based on the range of experience and knowledge of an earlier epoch, which was only 
partially appropriate as guidance to the reality of his own time» (Elias 2009:84). That meant to Elias that even if 
Adorno posed the right questions and was an “independent thinker”, the readers of Adorno’s writings never get 
«the decisive answer, so to speak, around the next corner» (Elias 2009:87). On the one hand, Elias suggests that 
Adorno’s humane Marxism was a major reason for his «ultimate indecision… to form a theoretical synthesis that 
went beyond the Marxian one», but finds, on the other hand, also an answer in the trajectory of Adorno’s life, the 
experiences that he had, as he as Elias had to leave Germany in the early 1930s. They shared many experiences as 
emigrant scholars.
In his presentation of Elias to the audience at the prize ceremony, Wolf Lepenies spoke of Adorno’s and Elias’s 
shared fates, but also stated that their epistemological outlook was both different and alike as well in broad out-
line as in detail (Elias 1977:31). At the end of his presentation Lepenies quoted some sentences from Adorno’s 
and Max Horkheimer’s joint and original book, Dialektik der Aufklärung1 that he found in essence mirrored much 
of what Elias also stood for. Elias for his part also referred to their writings, more precisely to their writings on 
culture and civilization in another book, Aspects of sociology2. Reading the chapter “Culture and Civilization” in this 
book, one indeed finds that Adorno et alii as Elias had a deep knowledge of European cultural history. Adorno’s 
discussion, however, ends in a, for Adorno et alii, rather typical way as they talk about «the chaotic and frightening 
aspect of the contemporary technological civilization… [however] it is not the rationalization of the world which 
is to blame for the evil, but the irrationality of this rationalization» (Aspects of sociology 1973:89). Elias, however, 
discussing the differences between his book published fifteen years earlier, rather explicitly states that they had 
not moved on in their thinking (Elias 2009:89). Their Marxist framework hindered them to fully come to terms 
with the longitudinal development.
2.
My aim with this article will be to follow two different tracks: I’ll on the one hand discuss what Adorno meant 
to me in the 1970s and onwards, and, on the other, show what my later readings and use of Elias’s writings have 
meant. This means by necessity that I’ll also compare their scholarly perspectives, and in conclusion show how I 
epistemologically have used and intend to use Elias’s multifaceted theories and writings, as I once more start on a 
longitudinal history of music project. My discussion and evaluation as a musicologist then starts from the perspec-
tive of the usefulness (to me) of Adorno’s and Elias’s different aims and working methods. 
1 First  published as Philosophical fragments in 1944, and later in many editions.
2  In Aspects of Sociology… , 1973:89-100 [in German 1956]. I’ll refer to it as Adorno et alii.
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At the time this prize ceremony took place, many Swedish musicologists were familiar with Adorno, but few 
had read Elias. The Swedish translation in 1976 of Adorno’s Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie - zwölf theoretische 
Vorlesungen (1962) was probably the first book, musicologists born from the 1940s, met. It got many to look for 
other works, in particular Die Philosophie der Neuen Musik. Since most colleagues at my department at that time 
was permeated with an interest in Marxist cultural theories, while at the same time several of the post-graduate 
students were involved in the jazz/rock/pop scene at that time, the studies of Adorno on the one hand, aroused 
our curiosity due to his style and method, while, on the other hand, we questioned his reasons for rejecting our 
music. To most of us, there was a considerable discrepancy between Adorno’s thoughts and our own experiences 
of contemporary popular music. 
We knew that Adorno had been heavily involved in music-sociological projects in the USA, but were still suspi-
cious of his conclusions since we as musicologists in the 1970s were involved in various empirical sociological and 
ethnomusicological projects. We gained a deeper insight into the pointlessness of instituting theoretical discourses 
on music without a solid ethnomusicological knowledge of the everyday usage, function and meaning of music. In 
short, we solved the conflict by holding that Adorno’s views were not empirically grounded. 
It is today easy to see that the reactions by people in the younger generations in the 1970s were also due to a 
limited insight of Adorno’s worldview. We didn’t understand how his world of ideas was created in a Germany that 
later was lacerated both materially and spiritually by the wars and course of events in Europe. Nor did we have a 
good understanding of how Adorno, as a gifted intellectual child of his time, came to be a bearer of a traditional 
German cultural tradition. 
A second wave of Adorno’s writings reached musicology in the beginning of the 1990s. Paradoxically enough, 
the impact from this Anglo-American wave was probably more difficult to notice than the first since it was broader 
and covered a wider scientific area than just musicology3. Furthermore, there was also an increasing interest in 
contemporary cultural theories altogether, which was largely due to the spread of the subject Cultural Studies4. 
Apart from the fact that writers on popular music as a rule questioned Adorno’s views on popular music5, we also 
noticed critical voices among sociologists, among them, Peter Martin’s influential book (1995). 
3.
I’ll return to Adorno’s perspectives in comparison to Elias, but let me first mention the Eliasian books I first 
encountered. The first was Involvement and Detachment (1987). I just happened to find it a bookshop in London 
in the late 1980s, ten years after the first Adorno wave. 
It is, of course, more than twenty years later, difficult to remember what I found so fascinating with Elias’s 
take on the story of The Fishermen in the Maelstrom. As I now browse through the book, I find I’ve scribbled 
many comments in the margin of the book. One of these I found on page 48, to the left of a sentence that I had 
underlined: «In short, the inability to control tends to go hand in hand with high emotivity of response, which 
keeps the chance of controlling the dangers of the process at low level, which keeps at a high level the emotivity 
of response, and so forth I». The comment I had written was “Rock ó Brahms” – by which I probably implied that 
rock, to its practitioners and audience at a concert, meant a higher level of emotivity and less distance, in contrast 
to those who play or listen to music by Brahms, which involved less emotivity, but more of a form of structural 
listening. All things being equal I would still hold that this often is the case and a common use of the two forms of 
music. Different use of music – different needs.
It was a different book, and it got me to read The Civilization Process in 1968 and 1969. Here I met the concept 
3 Cf. for instance Subotnik (1991) and McClary (1991).
4 Among the relevant literature Aronowitz (1994), Docker (1994), Eagleton (1990), Ingles (1993), Paddison (1993), Wolin (1992) and 
Zuidervaart (1994) can be mentioned.
5 Cf. Middleton (1990) concerning Adorno’s theories on popular music. For a wide ranging collection, with introductions by Richard 
Leppert of Adorno’s various writings on music, cf. Adorno (2002).
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of figurations, and was struck and delighted by Elias’ musical dance metaphor. The beginning was quite unex-
pected: «One should think of a mazurka, a minuet.. or rock’n roll.. mobile figurations of interdependent people 
on the dance floor.. like every other figuration social figuration, a dance figuration is relatively independent of the 
specific individual.. but of individuals as such»6�.
These books in a general way suited my conception on how cultures changed. The reason for this was quite 
simple; the thesis I had written in the 1970s was a historical and ethnomusicological study on the culture and spe-
cial singing tradition (yoik) of the Saami in Scandinavia up till the 1950s. My readings in social anthropology had 
simply made me susceptible to Elias’s theories. 
Some years later I found that my interest in Elias was shared by Paul Nixon, who at the time presented his 
ethnomusicological dissertation (1994) at my department. The single most important book, no doubt, for me in 
the 1980s was Stephen Mennell’s introduction to Elias’s scholarly world (1989). 
It is unknown to me if many musicologist in the 1980s where inspired by the publication of Elias’s books. A 
search today in the major musicological database, RILM, is not encouraging. Not even a search on ‘Elias, N’ on the 
ISI Web of Knowledge- Art & Humanities Citation Index result in more than 14 hits.
One of the earliest studies that is included in the list by RILM is my essay Fr-a-g-me-n-ts (1997). At that time 
musicology was heavily influenced dominated by an American form of musicology called New Musicology, and by 
French sociologist and philosophers. My long essay was at bottom a defense against my relative uninterestedness 
of or sceptical attitude to these traditions. The closing part of my essay had the headline Norbert Elias - all’s well 
that ends well. Even if musicologists at the time must have noted Elias’s book on Mozart (cf. below), I realized that 
probably few were familiar with Elias’s larger oeuvre. Let me thus briefly reiterate what I found valuable for musi-
cologist to consider. I gave a fairly short account on his writings and introduced Elias as a historically-oriented so-
ciologist who attached great importance to combining empirical knowledge from different fields, and felt that his 
scientific approach was as valid for social scientists as for humanists. Moreover, for Elias the individual was always 
inseparable from society, just as our language, our knowledge and our consciousness are all intimately connected 
in the societal process. Like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Elias was almost allergic to freezing the meaning of a concept; 
it was contrary to his conviction that everything is a process. A concept or word always stood in a processual re-
lationship to other words, in the same way that an isolated individual could never be understood without his/her 
social context (in Wittgenstein’s well-known words, private language games are nonsensical). These processes, 
just like processes in nature, were blind and unpredictable. I thus found Elias’s writings very inspirational. 
4.
I read Elias’s book on Mozart in German (1991a)7. I felt at that time very much at home with Elias’s episte-
mology, but I noticed that the reception of this book among sociologist and musicologist in the coming years was 
both varied and easy to understand. I’ll say something of the latter perspective.
It might, however, first be useful to comment on a form of ‘hearing fallacy’ that sometimes afflicts musicolo-
gists. The actual written music, for instance of a Mozart Sonata looks more or less the same today on paper as it 
did in the 1780s. It can at times easy to think that the composers, the performers and not least the listeners in the 
1780s heard the music in the same way that we do, hearing the music. The leading idea of the whole movement of 
historically informed performance that grew in importance form the 1960s, has actually been to close the soun-
ding gap as much as possible, using period instrument (or copies of them) and playing in the same way. The term 
HIL, historically informed listening, is a newer and promising development, and has recently been suggested by, 
among others, Vasili Byros (2009).  There is, however, really is neither a playing nor listening in the same way. This 
is one Elias’s basic ideas; a person’s position in time and space influences his way of thinking, planning, under-
standing, interpreting, seeing, listening and so on. What sounds/sounded the same does/did not sound the same. 
6  This quote is from the 1994 edition of The Civilizing Process (p. 214); rock n’roll, obviously, was not a dance in the 1930s.
7 The emphasis on ‘sociology’ was kept in the title in Swedish version (1991b), but not in the English translation (1993).
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Sociogenesis and psychogenesis are interrelated. 
Elias’s main aim is thus to understand Mozart’s predicaments, place and role from his contemporary social 
situation. The reactions from the reviewers, were, as mentioned varied. As I remember it, I thought that Andrew 
Steptoe’s review (1994), was representative for historical musicology at the time. He concluded rightly that the 
study was «a contribution to the sociology of art… that Elias saw Mozart as an exemplar of the transformation 
from craftsman’s art to artists’ art». Steptoe, however, also felt Elias «had a dangerously romantic view of the 
composer», but also though mentioned, correctly, that Elias hadn’t followed up musicological research on Mozart 
by “Robbins Landon and others”. 
Elias started out with this project in the late 1970s but didn’t proceed with it for many years. The project thus 
was unfinished. Around the time Elias’ book was released (from 1991) there was thus a huge output of books on 
Mozart (1756-1791). The publishers might have thought that the publication would stand out in the market. Bit it 
did not. Elias’s basic aim was to explain Mozart’s creative, musical possibilities within his social situation where he 
found himself; in short, at the social and psychological crossroad of contemporary psychogenesis and sociogenesis. 
Adorno never wrote a book on Mozart. His interests in contrast to Elias’s were different since of one of Adorno’s 
primary interest was to the work of music as a sedimented exemplar of the historical and social situations con-
tradictions and disillusions of the art object itself. Another difference was that Adorno, in contrast to Elias, was 
much more interested in studying the concepts of experience in history than the actual use of music or its praxis. 
5.
At the end of the 1990s I took part in an International Conference of Aesthetic. I felt — epistemically — 
rather lonely at the conference since my paper was on aesthetics as a primarily a social process rather than as a 
transcultural and a-historical phenomenon. My suspicion that philosophers often talked about Plato and Kant in 
the same sentence, conflating time and different mind sets into one was confirmed8. I tried to use aesthetic as key 
to my understanding of how and why the use of music had changed from the Greeks up till today. In my later book 
(2002/2008) I presented my task as finding information about:
[w]here/when/how/and with whom, song and music was played and listened to. To do this, one must examine the 
following factors: a) the social context, b) the references of individuals in groups, c) the music and d) the presentation 
of music in an intimate ensemble. These four create the framework for the use and reception of music, as well as its 
roll, function, and meaning. Any narrative about aesthetics should be placed within this thought matrix. (Edström 
2008:20) 
One chapter in the book deals with the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The latter is a particularly ho-
thouse of social-cultural-historical developments that changed the ways music were used and understood among 
small strata of people in central Europe. Already in 1735 Alexander Baumgarten thus appropriated the term 
aisthesis from the Greeks and wrote that «things perceived are to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object 
of the science of perception, or aesthetic» (1954:78 [1735:§ 116].  It was, thus, in this context I found much of 
use in Elias’s book on the court society (1983). It was to Elias, among others things, important to show that the 
court society created a personality type that had to maneuver completely in public, but whose behavior was at 
the same time very carefully regulated. The courtiers had always to maintain their prestige and standing and this 
prevailing etiquette informed their various art forms. The refined taste that they bore had a demarcating function 
downwards. Everyone’s prestige was the most important socio-economic resource. Elias describes how prestige 
became fetishized (Elias 1983:86). That meant that the courtiers viewed external objects differently than the 
bourgeoisie came to do in the nineteenth century. Things in and of themselves, for example, courtly art and music, 
meant less objectively than what they connoted in relationship to the never-ending power drama:
8 This a-historical take on philosophy has been more the rule than the exception, cf. Modern Philosophers (2000:x). Cf. also Kilminster’s 
magistral book (1998).
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 While we like to objectify or reify everything personal, court people personify the objective; for it was always with 
people and their positions relative to each other that they were primarily concerned…To enact their existence, to 
demonstrate their prestige, to distance themselves from lower ranking people and have this distance recognized by 
the higher-ranking — all this was purpose enough in itself. (Elias 1983:100).
Elias saw a parallel between the features of the French court and artistic sensibilities that became standardized 
under the ancien régime. Although Elias did not mention music specifically, his outlook and discussion clearly show 
the value of applying a sociological perspective to art. Music, thus, was almost always part of a larger ceremony. 
Opera, the most important form a courtly art, was not an activity of leisure because leisure time in the modern 
sense did not exist. 
In my book I gave an overview of how the structure of music and its role and function in the court society could 
be understood. Since art was a part of etiquette, compositions, too, was a part of the social game. Because of the 
representative function of art at the court, no courtier should needlessly be surprised by completely unexpected 
musical structures. The social game demanded that one was not adversely affected by very unexpected musical 
structures. Everything was predefined, even musical compositions. Composers, as a rule, wrote for the glory of 
the most high on earth and in heaven. 
I also emphasized that the bourgeoisie was also exposed to as many constraints as the members of court. The 
demands and strains that were part of professional life for the bourgeoisie were however different. Leisure, for 
instance, could be seen as a free zone in which a meaningful part of the musical aesthetic project could be develo-
ped, because the noble powers had little influence in this zone. The bourgeoisie, who principally lived in both the 
professional and the private worlds, found themselves and especially at the many German courts, in the shadow 
of a noble hegemony. This process carried on for many generations, and the outcome depended upon how one 
engaged and accepted the noble values of the time, as well on how the different rationality and thought processes 
that affected the bourgeoisie in their professional lives.
I showed thus how the structural changes in music can be understood as the process of psychogenesis and 
sociogenesis went on in the eighteenth century. We find many different musical styles that in its way mirrors the 
dynamic societal processes in the century. Perhaps it was generally as d’Alembert wrote in 1751 in an introduc-
tory text to the Encyclopedia, that of all the arts, music had made the greatest advances in recent years. A few 
decades later, a bearer of the latest style of music and a piano virtuoso, Ludvig van Beethoven, entered Vienna, a 
fact that take us back to Adorno.
6.
Reading The Dialectic of Enlightenment, one notices that Adorno and Horkheimer hadn’t changed their basic 
outlook (cf. the new preface written in 1969). Although Elias was in sympathy with their feelings, he differed 
from his predecessors and contemporaries in that his epistemological base and longitudinal view on the history 
of humans seems, to a greater extent than his contemporary colleagues, made it possible to form a new synthesis 
on the way to another. He saw syntheses as a more open ended task than Adorno who analyzed dialectical processes 
linked together in a complicated manner. The prerequisite for the former method arguably suggests a higher de-
gree of detachment than the latter. 
I sometimes (even) get the feeling, hard to pinpoint by showing actual a paragraphs in the writings within the 
Frankfurt school, that the promises formulated by a collective of writers in the Enlightenment should be believed 
to be more than a expectation, a stage that eventually would happen. This is not unheard of (Marx, for one). The 
problem looking back on history is as always the simple fact that we know — in this case — the answers given 
already in the nineteenth century to these promises. The utopian hope that Adorno incarnated meant, as Richard 
Leppert writes in his fine introduction to Adorno, «…that modernity and catastrophe were one, the bitter irony 
of which resided in the fact that modernity at its beginning has posited something fundamentally different, which 
might have been realized but was not…» (Adorno 2002:514). 
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It seems almost as Reason, in real life propagated by philosophers, educators, men and women of letters, was 
experiencing regret from the Greek civilization and especially, from the time of the Enlightenment, and in a spirit 
of dialecticism gave up on itself in disappointment over humanity’s handling of the experiment. I can’t help thin-
king, now and then that Adorno’s ‘utopian delusion’ sometimes made him doomed for life within the prison of his 
own thoughts. Poetry was written after Auschwitz, as also Adorno knew — and as Elias did. 
As Hermann Korte, commented, Elias leaves us with a chance, whereas: «Georg Simmel lamented the “trage-
dy of culture”.. and.. Horkheimer and.. Adorno found their words overtaken by the Holocaust» (Korte 2001:31). 
In Elias own words, as he thought back on his life in 1980s:
The theory of civilization and state formation, the symbol theory of knowledge and the sciences and, more broadly, 
the theory of processes and figurations that I have tried to elaborate are neither Marxian nor liberal, neither socialist 
nor conservative… That was - and is - undoubtedly one of the reasons for the difficult reception this [Elias’s] theory, 
and the books in which it is contained, have had.( 1994a:31) 
After Adorno returned to Europe he published many studies on the sociology of music, composers and aes-
thetics. As I wrote the chapter on the eighteenth century in my book (2002/2008), it was natural to engage in 
Adorno’s writings on Beethoven. Rolf Tiedemann, in the preface of his edition of Adorno’s book (1993) on Bee-
thoven, writes that Adorno started to write on Beethoven in the 1930s and that only some parts of this writings 
were published during Adorno’s life, but never a complete biography. In this collection of writings on Beethoven, 
we first encounter some memories from Adorno’ childhood, how he listened to and tried to play Beethoven, and 
what pieces he liked. Already to the teenager Adorno, it was as natural to listen to the late Beethoven as it was to 
study Kant. 
The fact, however, that music primarily is a syntactic system, with little semantic content, though a contextua-
lized object played, composed and listened to by humans in history, amounts to an almost invincible problem 
when one confronts the task of understanding what instrumental music means or what — if at all — it commu-
nicates. Just experiences of emotions or also propositions?
The long discursive Western tradition has framed the possibilities for what have been believed or taking for 
granted, so that, as we are born and insocialized into Western society, we will, for instance growing up find it natu-
ral to feel that the minor third somehow sounds sad. These problems of the interpretation of a sounding structure, 
however was, as a rule, not what was of special interest to Adorno. To him, the import of Beethoven’s composi-
tions mirrored the general societal developments that took place during his life. Adorno, thus, departed from the 
idea that art’s relationship to society was, in some sense, one to one. He was also convinced of that already in later 
eighteenth century, music, as an artefact,  more and more became a commodity. 
Adorno wrote on the stylistic changes that have traditionally lead musicologist to talk about Beethoven’s 
middle and late period. His structural music theoretical suggestions, however, are sweeping and rather inexact 
(standard complaints about Adorno’s working method). Adorno offered many comments on general structural 
differences between the two ‘styles’ and tried to show analogue societal developments9. While the music of Be-
ethoven in his middle period showed that the bourgeois place in society, their hope for personal freedom within 
a society imposing collective constraints on its citizens, had a meaning, this possibility — according to the way 
Adorno understood this music — was denied them. The balance between personal freedom and social constraints 
had begun to tip into an unplanned and false direction. As it became obvious that the historical moment in the 
middle period was gone and the foundations of the promises of the Enlightenment were felt to slip away no recon-
ciliation was possible. Beethoven’s music had to change since it was no longer possible to write authentic music. In 
order to keep its truth-content, known only to philosophical reflection, music had to become autonomous and an 
aesthetic art, thus criticizing the society. Music felt this. As Adorno said in the last sentence in his third fragment 
on Beethoven’s late style: «…In the history of art late works are the catastrophes…» (2002:567).
9 For commentaries see DeNora (2003:25ff); Leppert in Adorno (2002:513-34); Witkins (1998:28-68); Subotnik (1991:1-41).
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7. 
In contrast to Adorno, Tia DeNora in her book on Beethoven (1995) seeks to understand the circumstances in 
which he lived and worked in Vienna from the 1790s. «Culture and reality - she writes - [are categories] themsel-
ves created and recreated by socially located individuals and groups» (DeNora 1995:14). In order to understand 
how Beethoven’s artistic status was constructed, she first directs her interest to the culture of concerts and points 
out that whereas easily digested and entertaining pieces had earlier been favoured by the nobility and bourgeoisie, 
longer instrumental concerts and symphonies were soon being performed more often. Beethoven was a key figure 
in this transformation10. In spite of what is often taken for granted, and this seems to be Adorno’s point of depar-
ture, DeNora shows that it was the nobility rather than the bourgeoisie that took the late style to their hearts. By 
openly supporting Beethoven, the prominent nobility could more easily secure their leading position in music. 
DeNora’s major point then is that it is not possible to isolate one factor. It is known that the common audience 
in the first decades of the nineteenth century found Beethoven’s music different. He both played, improvised 
and composed in a manner that was clearly considered to deviate from common contemporary popular styles. It 
was not the case that the nobility, from a music stylistic point of view, really wanted to go along with the stylistic 
development of Beethoven’s music. It was rather a combination of concurrent factors that in the end functioned 
as a catalyst to this non-planned process. He could take artistic risks that were either not available, or simply not 
profitable to other musicians (DeNora 1995:71). 
DeNora clearly shows the difficulties one encounters when using an abstract explanation model to extract 
imagined abstract relations between structures in music and society. Her suggestions undermine the hypotheses 
of Adorno that Beethoven’s music was balancing between the extreme poles of freedom and force, as well as the 
ultimate reasons Adorno gave for why the music changed. 
However, if read positively, as I’ve tried, one could perhaps imagine a synthesis between the different views 
implying that the nobility’s actions (ongoing feudal force) were out-weighted by the presence of the bourgeois 
audience (recently found freedom). In any case, Beethoven’s music was not appreciated within larger groups of 
the bourgeoisie until well after his death11. 
8.
Elias and DeNora don’t analyze the music as such. Adorno, as we know, often did, but either on such a general 
level that nothing really new is added, or in such an idiosyncratic way, mirroring his own way of listening that it 
is difficult to know what to do with the comments12. Analyzing Beethoven’s music has been an ongoing thing now 
for over two hundred years. But anyone who has read the comments or type of swift analyses Adorno made, can’t, 
of course, doubt his enormous and detailed knowledge of music’s structure and his contemporary competence as 
a listener13.
In a comment of the different aims of Adorno’s and DeNora’s writings of Beethoven, Leppert comments that 
Adorno’s concern was «…the discursive implications of Beethoven’s music…» (Adorno 2002:513), whereas 
DeNora writes about patronage. The overall problem, however, is that Adorno doesn’t grapple with the use of 
10 Cf. Elias, 1998a:30f.
11 See Hetschel (2006) for an extraordinary study on the construction of the close connection between German art music and the Ger-
man nation As Paddison (1993:273) puts it Adorno «…often gives the impression that there is a smooth continuum between technical 
analysis, sociological critique and philosophical-historical interpretation, in spite of the calculatedly fragmented form in which he pre-
sents his ideas…»..
12 As Paddison (1993:273) puts it Adorno «often gives the impression that there is a smooth continuum between technical analysis, socio-
logical critique and philosophical-historical interpretation, in spite of the calculatedly fragmented form in which he presents his ideas».
13 What I find troubling though is his wishes to understand music, as it were, from the inside of itself. We don’t understand music, he 
would say, it understands us, and that goes for both musicians and laymen (Adorno 1993:15).
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music at the time from an ethnological-empirical perspective14. As DeNora puts it in her book on Adorno, his over-
theoretical approach indirectly shows what is not there, «sociologically and phenomenologically, though too strict 
adherence to ‘the facts’ of music history», and she adds that what is needed «is a greater attention to the detailed 
practice of composing, distributing, and consuming music, and… the social construction of musical worth» (De-
Nora 2003:26).
The change of style of Beethoven’s music is but one case, one of many cogs in Adorno’s total dialectical system 
that is full of dichotomies (antinomies). Indeed, even those, who first meet Adorno’s philosophy by reading stan-
dard lexicon articles will notice that the authors often start with a series of dialectical concepts. Edward Fagan, 
for instance discusses Adorno’s nihilistic outlook and writes that he «considers nihilism to be a consequence of 
domination and a testament, albeit in a negative sense»15. Lambert Zuidervaart concludes that Adorno denies 
that «the identity between thought and being, between subject and object, and between reason and reality… has 
been achieved in a positive fashion. For the most part this identity has occurred negatively instead.». Zuidervaart 
also writes that «whereas Hegel’s speculative identity amounts to an identity between identity and nonidentity, 
Adorno’s amounts to a nonidentity between identity and non-identity»16. As any reader of Adorno, books as Ae-
sthetic Theory or Minima Moralia know, it is almost always possible to find at least one sentence on every page that 
somehow seems to bite itself in its tail17.
 The fact Adorno’s styles of writing is supposed to do the same work as his dichotomies, to strive for a new 
insight, that is, a hope that seems to point to a promising insight. But as soon as an insight is felt to glimmer within 
the thought itself, the semantic content implodes in a dialectical twist. Adorno, thus, seems to have covered all 
aspects of reality by developing a long chain of concepts that in an infinite dialectical regress are interdependent 
and interact with another18. However one tries to see his points, there seems to be no real possibility whatsoever 
of using a cultural object in a positive way for mankind. The dialectical process fools us in the end. It is as our lives 
either are just going downhill in an eternal slalom race, or is going cross-country in a circle, possibly hoping to 
connect to the new point of arrival, only to find that any point of arrival has been moved to a different track at the 
pessimistic horizon. But dialectical explanations can hardly be an eternal and all-encompassing descriptive system 
for the intricate network of relationships that affect society’s blind process of development. Adorno’s dialectical 
web woven with his über-virtuosic use of language expands until it covers an impenetrable landscape. And, might 
it also be said, that Adorno, sometimes forgot his role as sociologist, and followed a long trail of philosophers from 
Platon onwards that started and ended in their own profession. Does music in the last resource has be explained 
from a philosophic point of view, i.e. as Adorno put it: «That music can say just what is its own, that means that 
words and concepts are not in position to immediately express its content but can facilitate it, i.e. as philosophy…» 
14 Cf. also Spitzer (2006) who following in the footsteps of Adorno has written an engaging study on Beethoven’s late style. I can’t do 
justice to Spitzer’s engaging book here. The book is full of music examples that contribute to his suggestions, and he, to show one quote, 
sums up Adorno’s position very well: «…Music is the most autonomous art... the more it [music] retreated into itself, the more music 
chimed with the patterns that govern thought, language, economic exchange, and social dynamics. A conventionalized musical structure, 
since the content it subsumes can be exchanged without loss of meaning, resembles a) the abstraction of a concept, b) the normativity 
of syntax, c) the fungibility of a commodity, and d) the order of the bureaucratically administered society. Music, then, is also a sover-
eign art. This, in a nutshell, is the antinomy of enlightened music. Adorno believed that Beethoven embodied this antinomy at its most 
extreme…» (2006:268). My chief criticism with Spitzer’s book, though, is that his perspective is, as the title says, music as philosophy 
(2006:3). DeNora, by the way, is referred to only three times.
15 Fagan (http://www.iep.utm.edu/adorno/ (accessed 2010.09.28).
16  Zuidervaart (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno/ (accessed 2010.09.28).
17One finds thus in Adorno’s works lots of sentences with contradictions, dialectical reversals etc. that arguably sum up what cannot be 
fully explained as shown by these three random examples from Aesthetic Theory: «I artworks are answers to their own questions, they 
themselves thereby truly become questions» (1997:6) and «Art desires what has not yet been, though everything that art is has already 
been» (1997:134). This book, a heroic undertaking to understand aesthetics as it were from inside aesthetic’s own understanding of 
aesthetic objects themselves, was found unfinished.
18 I don’t want to seem über-critical of Adorno’s writings. There is no doubt that he must be considered as one of the most influential 
scholars in the 20th century. My perspective on Adorno’s oeuvre today has, of course, changed since the 1970s. The basic question one 
stands before, though, is the same: how come to terms with the dialectical workings of his theories.
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(Adorno 1993:31, my translation). 
It is no surprise that there exist an ongoing industry of interpretation of Adorno’s writings. Moreover, as time 
goes by, the critical voices seem also to grow in importance (cf. Edström 2008: 111,189). One problem that 
Paddison discusses at great length is that Adorno, never satisfactorily succeeded in explaining how the process of 
interaction between music and society actually worked. It remains highly elusive and was never systematically ex-
plored (Paddison 1993:108ff)19. Again then we find the same baffling problem; how to explain in writing how the 
mediation between music and society when music, to start with, is very weak representational or semantic system 
of communication?
In the field of musicology Giles Hooper – following a trail that, among others Peter Martin has treaded – has 
recently offered a penetrating illumination of Adorno’s discourse on mediation (Hooper 2006). Although Adorno 
argued that pure thought doesn’t exist since thinking and believing are socio-historical forms of man’s activities, 
he still - as a sociologist concerned with mediation and value judgments - held very personal and strong beliefs of 
values. Adorno’s enthusiasm of Schönberg’s music, and vice versa, his analyses of the hidden meanings in Stravin-
sky’s music are well known. 
The problem of explicit value judgments seems to be an always present problem for most writers on the 
sociology arts. I try, but do not always succeed, to stick to Max Weber’s idea of value neutrality, and contain or 
bracket out my own value judgments. It is, of course, hardly possible to write that the fact that I happens to like 
X more than Y, is a neutral fact to me, but it would have been less neutral, to start with the idea that somehow 
only Y’s music contains a truth-value understood (heard?) from a philosophical point of view. As Giles Hooper 
compares Martin’s and Adorno’s contrasting views, he also finds that for the former, value judgments represent 
raw data with which to start his sociological investigation, while for the latter, «such material is an already media-
ted subject-matter requiring historical and philosophical interpretation in order to reveal its negative moment of 
truth» (Hooper 2006:108). 
The interpretation of Adorno’s oeuvre goes on with undiminished strength. The Dialectical Counter-Enlightenment 
(Thorne 2009), one of the most recent contributions, already in its title, signals its basic position: if we follow the 
history of anti-foundationalism in philosophical manner we find in the end that it can’t be defended. The nihilism 
of Adorno’s project can’t be saved; we must find, another way to use reason and knowledge - however defined in 
a postmodern world, a commodity in itself among any other (?) - as means, in the spirit of a dialectical Counter-
Enlightenment, to unwrap the knot (cf. 2009: 15ff, 310ff). As I see it, the method of cutting a problem with a 
sword, was always a too easy way, and spoiled the possibility of unwrapping it. It might be a political trick, but 
not an academic.
10.
It is well known Adorno’s negative views on some composer’s music in the 20th century was nothing in com-
parison to his dislike for many forms of contemporary popular music. To him the products manufactured by the 
so called culture industry were openly commodities, structured to optimize their marketability and of no value 
in itself. The entertainment industry of modern society was as mechanical, formulaic, and dominating as the 
workplace. The music/songs were themselves as empty of content and monotonous as the work most people had 
to do. It meant that every object had the same commodified form. In a comment to these views, the sociologist 
Nigel Dodd  19 wrote that the most basic function of the culture industry, is stupification: «It disables us psycholo-
gically and emotionally. It acts as psychoanalysis in reverse» (Dodd 1991:91). Adorno thus saw the consumer as a 
passive container, His judgment upon all those who listened to commercial music was tough since he understood 
the backside of the fetishism of music as the regression of listening. Not only did the listening subjects lose, along 
with freedom of choice and their ability to think; the music industry also deafened people’s consciousness due to 
the endless repetitive noise that Adorno found popular music to contain. This was also because of what popular 
19 Subotnik (1991:19) even writes that the relationship between structure in Beethoven’s music and culture surfaces through a complex 
form of mediation processes «which Adorno does not pretend to understand or elucidate adequately».
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music was not, art music or art in general. Adorno often recurred to the idea that true art’s position in society (in 
contrast to popular art) could be the last hope for the possibility of redemption:
For art allies itself with repressed and dominated nature in the progressively rationalized and integrated society. Yet 
even industry makes even this resistance an institution and changes it into coin. It cultivates art as a natural reserve 
for irrationalism, from which thought is to be excluded. (Adorno 1997:336).
My critique of Adorno, as I have said, always develops from the position that music is an object that at all 
time, now as before, is used - heard, listened to, sung, played - and that whatever music meant (means), how it 
functioned, what role it played must be understood from this perspective. This process can’t be understood from 
a philosophical belvederes, however talented the observers are. 
As Elias’s wrote in his article on Adorno he didn’t come to «terms intellectually with the contradiction betwe-
en the original teaching of Marx and the unplanned development which was taking place» (2009:87). One such 
factor that changed the function of music was of course the oncoming and development of mass media – a 
development that went (and goes) on with unforeseen consequences. One is reminded of the sociologist Karl 
Mannheim’s dictum:
Each idea acquires a new meaning when it is applied to a new life situation. When new strata take over systems of 
ideas from other strata, it can always be shown that the same words mean something different to the new sponsors, 
because these latter think in terms of different aspirations and existential configurations. This social change of fun-
ction, then, is... also a change of meaning. (1952:188)
Adorno and his circle of course thought much about what music from loudspeakers meant to radio and gra-
mophone listeners. To Adorno art music in radio lost its “aura”. He believed that people almost always heard radio 
music in a depersonalized, collective, objectified form, which robbed music of the possibility of its negative fun-
ction. His pessimism deafened his hearing.
11.
I’m presently drilling deeper into especially the eighteenth century in order to understand how the structure 
of music changed, how reactions to different kinds of music performed changed, and how these changes could be 
understood as music was used in different and changing ways in relation to the ongoing psychic changes of men 
and women within the developing trends and changes in society. I want, in short, to study the changes of music’s 
role, function and meaning in relation to the interrelated changes of sociogenesis and psychogenesis in the eighte-
enth century. The reader, thus, will not be surprised that I’ve once more returned to Norbert Elias’s writings on 
the time of the Enlightenment20.
The period of time that is of special interest to me goes from ca 1720-1770, in music stylistic terms from high-
baroque to Vienna Classicism. This period of time has traditionally been of relatively little interest to musicologist. 
The combined shadows of Bach and Händel on the one hand, and on the other, Haydn and Mozart have meant that 
the composers in between have been regarded as less important.
It will, thus, be necessary to think more deeply in what the refined taste of the nobleman, the galant homme. It 
was a taste that from the top downwards had a demarcating function. One is, thus, reminded of a analogous com-
ment by the music theoretician and composer Johann Mattheson, who in 1739, concerning the leading melody, 
20 A personal sight. There is today always the fear that there is too much empirical material to be found, making a better synthesis of the 
process an utterly complicated task. There are moments when I think the sheer mountain of facts and ideas will disappear in a black hole 
before it will be possible to form a better synthesis. I have, thus, no doubt about that it will not be possible to find all the pieces of the 
puzzle I want to present. Neither do I doubt that that coming generations will understand the process differently; to do sociological-
historical research means at bottom that you’ll have to use yourself as carrier of a contemporary group-habitus which makes it impossible 
to understand your life world from a future perspective. As a child of your time certain spaces of opportunities are open – others not yet 
foreseeable, the earlier ones can only, in a detached way, be fusioned into your own.
66 Anno I, Numero II/Dicembre 2011
Olle Edström              DOI: 10.1400/201002
wrote that «…the others (harmony and rhythm) conduct themselves in relation to melody, as in a monarchy…» 
(Mattheson 1999:145 [1739]). 
The reasons that new styles (i.e. the Galant style) made inroads meant that they had relevance on a (group-)
individual level21. Since I’m interested in the interrelated changes between man, music and society, a grounded 
knowledge of the societal changes is of outmost importance. As Elias has commented, in France the change, «from 
the “baroque” to the “rococo”.. is a change within the frame of the same social stratum»( Elias 1998b:27). But 
even if the change that Elias here mentions was an intra-cultural change it affected the bourgeoisie, and meant, 
especially in Germany that many, influenced by enlightened ideas, were affected by the new ways of thinking to 
discover both their rational and emotional selves - but also to discover the irrationality of the world contributing 
on the one hand to the founding of movements as Pietism, and on the other for the intelligentsia how ‘gout’-‘taste’ 
was grounded. The initial and cautious scientific and rational way of understanding the world paradoxically, also 
fostered its accepted opposite, a different kind of sensuality. To my mind, then, the importance of this process 
from a musicological point of view, has not been fully explained in an Eliasian manner. 
As also Carl Dahlhaus (1980) repeatedly stressed, but seldom followed up in any detail, it is important to 
look for ‘sozialgesichtliche Erklärungen’, social-historical explanations, rather than just music stylistic in order to 
understand this change. One obvious important reason - both a musical and a social reason - for instance was the 
introduction of different kinds of noble and bourgeoisie music entertainments, i.e. public concerts that took place 
at coffee houses and other ‘higher’ public venues from the beginning of the century. 
The process clearly took place at different speeds in different places. As Elias has showed, it was much easier for 
the French bourgeoisie, which in general were more prosperous than their German counterparts, to rise within 
the centralized French kingdom. The German situation was quite different, party the result of an abundance of 
smaller duchies, heavily influenced by French culture and Italian music, and with fewer prospects for the bou-
rgeoisie to rise to influential positions. The division between nobility and the bourgeoisie was especially sharp in 
Germany. It fostered an inward movement whereby the bourgeoisie, as we put it today, had to find themselves. 
For the Germans, literature, poetry and music were arguably even more rewarding and valuable compensations 
for the lack of political influence than for the bourgeoisie in France or Britain. And as Elias wrote: «With isolated 
examples, one finds in Germany before 1789 no idea of concrete political action» (Elias 1994:15). They instead 
invested more and more energy in their Kultur, their education and sensibility. This inward-seeking movement 
found to a high extent its expressions in poetry and music. The new emotional style of writing letters and styles 
of Empfindsamkeit clearly points to this, and can easily be showed in poetical and musical detail22.
Studying longitudinal changes it is necessary to hold as many balls in air - no least those of power and economic 
force – as possible and study how the interact and bounce into each other in an unforeseen way. This is one Elias’s 
fundamental lesson and a basic rule of the unplanned social games. In Stephen Mennell words: 
The models [the game models] demonstrate the not-altogether-commonplace insight that the more relatively equal 
become the power ration among large numbers of people and groups… the more likely is it that the outcome will 
be something that no single person or group has planned or anticipated. Elias considerably broadens the idea of the 
‘unanticipated consequences of purposive social action’, which Robert Merton traced back to (inter alia) Adam 
Smith’s ‘hidden hand’ and Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’. (Mennell 1998b:23).
This slow change of this power balance meant that a new market oriented the capitalistic-industrial bourge-
oisie taste came to overlap the earlier court taste the further we get into the nineteenth century. Elias, already in 
The Court Society, spoke of this process:
21  Still, opera and vocal music in its many forms were during the whole century counted as the highest or first kind of music. It meant 
that one could concentrate on the story and the lyrics, it afforded, compared with instrumental music, a different type of listening.
22 Earlier on, already in the 1720s one can trace how the new musical style, galant style, meant a concentration on the leading melody 
and the oncoming of more reserved attitude towards intricate polyphonic structures in music. As is well-known J. A. Scheibe in the 
1730s indirectly criticized Bach’s music of being too complicated either to perform or to hear. Indeed, as the Bach-scholar Christoph 
Wolff (1991:374) has written: «An orientation toward the taste and needs of a wider public seems to have been entirely foreign to Bach».
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As soon as exclusive, elitist tendencies appear in bourgeois strata, they also express themselves in prestige symbols di-
rected at maintaining the group’s distance from others, while transfiguring its existence. In these symbols the group’s 
existence is presented as an end in itself surrounded by its aura of prestige, even though in the case of bourgeois strata 
utilitarian values and economic interests mingle with the prestige-values. (1983:103)
By that time we find ourselves in the third period of Beethoven’s music, thus, have left the musical process that 
I intend to write more deeply about. 
I hope then in detail to show how the European bourgeois person’s altered living conditions, available education, 
a new work/leisure structure, the division of time into work and leisure, economic power, and so forth, added 
to the changing processes in communal life. Enclosed in the same process we find, thus, that the new music styles 
were developed and categorized. There is thus every reason to, in an Eliasian way, try to understand how societies 
and cultures transformed the way people used and understood the changing structures of song and music. Socio-
genesis and psychogenesis work together. 
To conclude: Dichotomous thinking sooner or later lands into a straight-jacket and limits epistemological 
thinking. To let Elias have the last words, he might thus have thought on Adorno as Elias, in a later preface to The 
Civilizing Process wrote:
 Social phenomena in reality can only be observed as evolving and having evolved; their dissection by mean of pairs of 
concepts which restricts the analysis to two antithetical states represent an unnecessary impoverishment of sociologi-
cal perception on both empirical and theoretical levels. (Elias 1994:186).
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